OpenAI has developed GPT-Red, an automated red-teaming model designed to discover vulnerabilities in AI systems at a scale that human testers alone cannot achieve. The internal-only tool has already been used to strengthen GPT-5.6 Sol, which the company describes as its most robust production model to date against prompt injection attacks.
AI systems routinely interact with third-party data through browsers, connected apps, local files, and other tools. While these capabilities are essential for real-world tasks, they also open new avenues for malicious actors to manipulate model behavior. A crafted instruction hidden in an email, webpage, or code repository could trick a model into uploading sensitive data to an external server.
The Scalability Problem with Human Red-Teaming
Human red-teaming has long been a cornerstone of OpenAI's safety work, helping researchers uncover vulnerabilities before deployment. However, the process is inherently difficult to scale. Designing and running these exercises is time-intensive, which limits how quickly new failure modes can be identified and addressed. While human testers produce valuable examples of successful attacks, they cannot generate the volume and diversity of adversarial data needed to meaningfully improve model robustness through training.
OpenAI also notes that commonly used robustness evaluations have already been saturated by its latest models, meaning existing benchmarks no longer adequately challenge new systems. The company recognized that safety and alignment methods need to scale alongside model capabilities, prompting the development of automated red-teaming models that can uncover vulnerabilities before deployment and generate attacks during training.
How GPT-Red Works
GPT-Red was trained using self-play reinforcement learning, in which the model and a collection of diverse defender large language models are trained simultaneously across a broad set of red-teaming scenarios. GPT-Red is rewarded for eliciting a valid failure, such as a successful prompt injection, while the defender models are rewarded for resisting attacks and completing their original tasks. As defenders become more robust, GPT-Red is forced to discover stronger and more diverse attacks.
To support this training, OpenAI built an expansive set of realistic scenarios where prompt injections might be inserted. Each environment includes a threat model specifying what GPT-Red can control — such as part of a local file, a webpage banner, an email body, or tool output — and what constitutes a successful attack.
OpenAI trained GPT-Red at the compute scale of some of its largest post-training runs, describing it as an unprecedented amount of computing power dedicated purely to improving safety. After completing training, GPT-Red proved capable of breaking nearly all models it was tested against, including both internal and production models up to and including GPT-5.5.
The model is kept strictly separate from deployed systems, ensuring that the malicious capabilities trained into GPT-Red do not fall into the hands of adversarial actors.
Real-World Testing: Vending Machines and Data Exfiltration
OpenAI evaluated GPT-Red's ability to generalize beyond its training environment using a replicated version of the indirect prompt injection arena from Dziemian et al. (2025). In this challenge, both human red-teamers and GPT-Red independently proposed attacks against GPT-5.1 on pre-specified environments distinct from those used in training. GPT-Red achieved a significantly higher attack success rate, succeeding on 84% of scenarios compared to 13% for human testers.
